Cold War Briefing

Briefing Issue 2- 10/10/2025

Operation BIG LIFT

Operation Big Lift, conducted from October 22 to November 1963, stands as one of the largest and most ambitious military airlift exercises in U.S. history. This Cold War-era operation involved the rapid deployment of the U.S. Army's 2nd Armored Division—nicknamed "Hell on Wheels"—from Fort Hood, Texas, to West Germany, demonstrating America's ability to swiftly reinforce NATO allies in the event of a Soviet invasion. Over 15,000 troops and hundreds of tons of equipment were transported across the Atlantic in under 72 hours, marking a pivotal test of strategic air mobility. The exercise not only showcased logistical prowess but also addressed European anxieties about potential U.S. troop withdrawals amid fiscal pressures.

The operation emerged in the tense geopolitical climate of the early 1960s, following the 1961 Berlin Crisis, which had prompted the prepositioning of vast stocks of military equipment in Europe to enable quick reinforcements. By 1963, under President John F. Kennedy's administration, the U.S. faced mounting defense costs and a balance-of-payments deficit exacerbated by overseas troop deployments. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara sought $4 billion in savings, including potential reductions in U.S. forces in Europe, which alarmed NATO partners—particularly West Germany—fearing a diminished American commitment against the Warsaw Pact threat.

Big Lift's primary purpose was to reassure allies of U.S. resolve while testing the feasibility of airlifting an entire armored division to Europe, equipping it with prepositioned hardware, and integrating it into combat operations within days. It simulated a response to a Warsaw Pact assault through the Fulda Gap, a key invasion corridor along the East-West German border. The exercise highlighted the Military Air Transport Service's (MATS) global reach, involving coordination with NATO and proving that the U.S. could surge forces rapidly without permanent overseas garrisons, thus supporting rotational deployment concepts.

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Planning and Preparation

Planning for Big Lift spanned months, with the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) devoting significant resources to maintain prepositioned stocks—enough for two divisions and ten support elements, including 319 M48 medium tanks, 76 howitzers, and 429 M59 armored personnel carriers stored at depots in Kaiserslautern, Mannheim, Pirmasens, and Germersheim. These assets, idle since 1961, required over 1,000 personnel for months of preparation, including fueling vehicles and readiness checks.

The deploying force centered on the 2nd Armored Division under Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Burba, augmented by 1,600 artillerymen and truck drivers from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Troops were briefed on bilingual signage and packed lightly: 30-pound field kits with essentials like M-14 rifles, helmets, and winter gear, despite Texas heat. MATS mobilized 40% of its fleet—206 aircraft from 30 bases across the U.S., Canada, Bermuda, the Azores, and Europe—while the Tactical Air Command deployed a Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) of 119 supersonic fighters (F-100s, F-105s) and reconnaissance planes, supported by C-130 transports and KC-135 tankers. Two weeks of final prep at Fort Hood ensured precision, with bus rides to airfields timed to the minute.

Big Lift commenced at midnight on October 22, 1963, with the first C-135 Stratolifter departing Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, for a nonstop 5,600-mile flight to Rhein-Main, Germany. Over 63 hours and 5 minutes—nine hours ahead of the 72-hour goal—206 MATS flights carried 15,278 soldiers and 459.6 tons of gear (including 3.4 million pounds of baggage and light weapons), logging 13,000 flight hours and consuming 6.5 million gallons of fuel without major incidents. Troops endured sweltering cargo holds (up to 110°F) on routes skirting the Arctic or via refueling stops, arriving at Rhein-Main, Sembach, and Ramstein in darkness before trucking to depots.

The CASF deployed concurrently to French and German bases, providing air cover with minimal delays despite fog, hurricane winds off the U.S. East Coast, and refueling glitches (e.g., a bent tanker boom forcing four F-100s to return). By October 25, all units had "married up" with prepositioned equipment, a feat normally requiring six weeks by sea.

The Exercise Phase

Post-arrival, the 2nd Armored Division joined a week-long NATO maneuver, "Exercise BIG LIFT," directed by Lt. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams of V Corps. The "Blue" force—comprising the 2nd Armored, 8th Infantry Division elements, 3rd Armored Cavalry, and a German Panzer Grenadier battalion—faced the "Orange" force from the 3rd Infantry Division in simulated battles from Darmstadt to Marburg-Hersfeld. Involving 46,000 personnel, 900 tanks, and 759 Air Force sorties, the choreographed clashes saw Blue repel Orange but suffer heavy simulated losses.

Parallel command-post exercises by VII Corps simulated deploying the 4th Infantry Division to the West German-Czech border. Troops then rested, maintained gear, and conducted live-fire drills before redeployment from November 12–21, with the last soldiers home by December 4—two weeks early. About 550 remained briefly to aid USAREUR.

Despite success, Big Lift faced hurdles. Logistical snags included a C-130 door malfunction causing a three-hour delay and crew-rest rules extending transit times. Prepositioned gear proved obsolete (e.g., M48 tanks lagged behind newer models), and its advance preparation masked real wartime vulnerabilities like airfield denial or stockpile sabotage. USAREUR diverted massive resources, straining operations, while German press fretted over U.S. pullouts, fueled by McNamara's cost-cutting rhetoric—prompting reassurances from officials like Dean Rusk.

Critics, including USAREUR Commander Gen. Paul L. Freeman Jr., dubbed it a "big hoax," arguing it wasn't a true airlift test due to pre-staged equipment and peacetime rules. Costs hit $5.8 million initially, ballooning to $9–20 million with damages.

Big Lift was hailed as a logistical triumph, proving a division could deploy in 40 hours under crisis conditions and ten divisions in 30 days. President Kennedy intended to tout it in a November 22 speech as evidence of U.S. readiness, but his assassination prevented this. It quelled NATO fears temporarily, influencing McNamara's push for allied force commitments before U.S. reductions.

Long-term, it birthed REFORGER exercises from 1969, airlifting brigades annually to Europe for NATO drills—key to Cold War deterrence. Rotational concepts reduced overseas footprints, saving billions, and informed Vietnam-era mobility. Big Lift underscored airpower's strategic edge, paving the way for C-141 Starlifters.

Operation Big Lift exemplified Cold War brinkmanship, blending showmanship with substance to affirm U.S. power projection. While not flawless, its execution bolstered alliance cohesion and reshaped deployment doctrine, contributing to NATO's endurance against Soviet threats. In retrospect, it was less boondoggle than boon—a blueprint for flexible, rapid response that echoed through decades of U.S. military strategy.

References

[1] Futrell, R. F. (1983). The United States Air Force in Europe, 1951-1963. Office of Air Force History. [2] U.S. Army. (1964). Operation Big Lift: Historical Study. Department of the Army. [3] Nalty, B. C. (1995). The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The War in the Air, 1961-1963. Air Force History and Museums Program. [4] Kaplan, L. S. (1994). The United States and NATO: The Formative Years. University Press of Kentucky. [5] Smyser, W. R. (1999). From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany. St. Martin's Press. [6] Kaufman, B. I. (1982). Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy in the Middle East. Johns Hopkins University Press. [7] Schwartz, D. N. (1983). NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas. Brookings Institution Press. [8] U.S. Air Force. (1964). "Operation Big Lift." Air University Review, 15(2), 45-58. [9] Clarke, D. W. (2008). The Battle for the Fulda Gap. Westview Press. [10] Condit, K. M. (1971). History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Test of War, 1959-1969. U.S. Government Printing Office. [11] U.S. Army Europe. (1963). Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel in Europe. USAREUR Historical Files. [12] Ibid. [13] Burba, E. H. (1964). "After Action Report: Operation Big Lift." U.S. Army Records Group 407. [14] Stars and Stripes. (1963, October 23). "Hell on Wheels Rolls Out for Big Lift." [15] MATS. (1963). Operation Big Lift: Airlift Summary. Military Air Transport Service Archives. [16] U.S. Army. (1964). Operation Big Lift: Historical Study. [17] New York Times. (1963, October 23). "U.S. Airlift to Germany Begins." [18] MATS. (1963). Operation Big Lift: Airlift Summary. [19] Air Force Times. (1963, November 6). "Troops Endure Heat in Big Lift." [20] U.S. Tactical Air Command. (1963). CASF Deployment Report. [21] Futrell, R. F. (1983). The United States Air Force in Europe, 1951-1963. [22] Abrams, C. W. (1963). "Exercise BIG LIFT Directive." V Corps Records. [23] U.S. Army. (1964). Operation Big Lift: Historical Study. [24] Der Spiegel. (1963, November 13). "NATO-Manöver: Großeinsatz in der Fulda-Gap." [25] VII Corps. (1963). Command Post Exercise Report. [26] U.S. Army. (1964). Operation Big Lift: Historical Study. [27] Ibid. [28] MATS. (1963). Operation Big Lift: Airlift Summary. [29] Freeman, P. L. (1964). Memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff on Operation Big Lift. [30] Rusk, D. (1963, October 25). Statement to NATO Council. Department of State Bulletin. [31] Freeman, P. L. (1964). Memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff on Operation Big Lift. [32] Condit, K. M. (1971). History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Test of War, 1959-1969. [33] McNamara, R. S. (1963). Press Conference on Operation Big Lift. [34] Sorensen, T. C. (1965). Kennedy. Harper & Row. [35] Schwartz, D. N. (1983). NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas. [36] U.S. European Command. (1970). REFORGER: Annual Report. [37] Futrell, R. F. (1983). The United States Air Force in Europe, 1951-1963. [38] Nalty, B. C. (1995). The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. [39] Kaplan, L. S. (1994). The United States and NATO. [40] Clarke, D. W. (2008). The Battle for the Fulda Gap.

Written by :Joseph Teed (Founder of the Cold War Outpost History Group)

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